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ABSTRACT
After 9/11 the United States began to implement a national
security policy that employs targeted killings to fight the “War on
Terror” and kill suspected terrorists. Starting with the Bush
administration and continuing through each US administration, the
United States has expanded who can be the object of a targeted
killing and when they can be killed. This Note analyzes the legal
justifications set forth by the United States for this expansion. This
Note specifically addresses the United States’ capitalization on the
ambiguity of the imminence requirement of Article 51 of the United
Nations ("UN") Charter (“Article 51”) to broaden the circumstances
in which the United States can resort to the use of force in selfdefense. Also examined in this Note is the ineffectiveness of US
accountability protocols within the targeted drone strike program
that have allowed the United States to violate its own interpretation
of the distinction principle of international humanitarian law. This
Note argues that in order to reduce the prospective of a long-term
threat to national security and the increased potential for innocent
civilian casualties, the United States should clearly define imminence
under Article 51 of the UN Charter and Congress should strengthen
accountability measures through legislative action to enhance the
options for redress for victims of targeted drone strikes.
I.

INTRODUCTION TO THE UNITED STATES TARGETED KILLING
PROGRAM

A concept once novel, now embraced. Before the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States had never used
armed drones1 in combat to target and kill its enemies.2 Now,
targeted killings and drone warfare have become the core of the

1. Armed drones, also referred to as Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are
defined as aircrafts that are designed to operate without a pilot on board. Armed drones
are remotely controlled by a human from the ground and are not fully autonomous. Armed
L.
ENCYCLOPEDIA
(2021),
Unmanned
Aerial
Vehicles,
WEAPONS
http://www.weaponslaw.org/weapons/armed-unmanned-aerialvehicles#:~:text=An%20armed%20drone%20is%20an,sometimes%20thousands%20of
%20miles%20away [https://perma.cc/294X-VZNH].
2. See Peter Bergen & Jennifer Rowland, Drone Wars, 36 WASH. Q. 7, 8 (2013).
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“War on Terror.”3 While the Bush administration only engaged in
a limited number of drone strikes,4 the United States has killed up
to 16,900 people in drone strikes between 2010 and 2020.5 The
first armed drone strike ever was conducted by the United States
in mid-November 2001, killing Mohammed Atef, the military
commander of al-Qaeda.6 In the Obama Administration’s most
high-profile strike, the United States targeted and killed US citizen
Anwar al-Aulaqi in Yemen in September 2011.7 In the early
morning of January 3, 2020, the Trump Administration launched a
Reaper drone, targeting and killing prominent Iranian General
Qasem Soleimani in Iraq.8 The escalation in the number of drone
strikes conducted and the increasingly high-profile identities of the
targets,9 demonstrates that the United States is bolder than ever in
determining who can be the object of a targeted drone strike and
when.
Over the past three presidential administrations, the United
States has expanded the pool of individuals who can be acceptably
targeted and killed in a drone strike. The Trump administration
went so far as to target and kill a State-actor10 without consent of

3. The “War on Terror” is the term used to describe the American military
counterterrorism campaign in response to the 9/11 attacks on the United States by alQaeda. See Richard Jackson, War on Terrorism, BRITANNICA (last visited Sept. 19, 2021),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/war-on-terrorism [https://perma.cc/BA25-SN62].
4. The Bush administration conducted an estimated fifty drone strikes.
Comparatively, the Obama administration authorized 1,878 strikes in his two terms and
the Trump administration authorized 2,243 drone strikes in the first two years of his
presidency. See Bergen & Rowland, supra note 2.
5. See Sara Toth Stub, Targeted Killings, CQ PRESS 1, 4 (Apr. 9, 2021).
6. See Bergen & Rowland, supra note 2.
7. See Anwar al-Awlaki Killed in Yemen – As it Happened, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 30,
2011),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/blog/2011/sep/30/anwar-al-awlakiyemen-live [https://perma.cc/BQ8L-473D].
8. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Illusory Standard of Imminence in the International
Law of Self-Defense: The Killing of Qassim Soleimani at 42 (Feb. 12, 2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3784820
[https://perma.cc/9ZPB-699M].
9. The United States went from targeting and killing an al-Qaeda commander in a war
zone, to targeting and killing a US citizen outside of a war zone, to killing a State-actor in a
country with which the United States was not at war without the consent of the State of
which the actor represented or the host state where he was killed.
10. Actors are entities that participate in or promote international relations. The two
types of actors involved in international relations include State and non-State actors. State
actors represent a government, and non-State actors do not. State and Non-state Actors in
International
Politics,
UKESSAYS,
(July
22,
2021),
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the State he represented or the State in which he was killed and
with conflicting accounts of the threat he posed.11 The United
States further increased this pool when it mistakenly nominated
innocent civilians to the US kill list and authorized drone strikes
that misidentified civilians as terrorists.12 The expansion of when
it is an acceptable time to strike and who is an acceptable target of
a strike is due to two factors. First, the United States employs a
broader concept of imminence not aligned with European and
human rights groups,13 which has increased the number of
circumstances by which the United States can employ armed force
in self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
Second, the United States does not have accountability measures in
place that sufficiently ensure that a civilian will not be the object of
attack, as is required in order to comply with the principle of
distinction in international humanitarian law, resulting in the
execution of civilians.
This Note addresses the mechanisms used by the United
States to broaden the authorization for when a targeted drone
strike can take place, who can be the object of such a strike, the
issues that arise from this expansion, and offers recommendations
to address these issues. Part II argues that the United States has
taken advantage of the ambiguity of the imminence requirement
outlined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Article 51 allows a country
to resort to the use of force in self-defense and is an exception to
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter’s general prohibition on the use of
force. The actions of the United States have established a long-term
threat to national security, as other nations will imitate the United
https://www.ukessays.com/essays/politics/nonstate-actors-international-politics1781.php [https://perma.cc/N7Q2-NPJY].
11. The United States claimed that General Soleimani posed an “imminent threat”
because he was planning large-scale attacks on American embassies abroad. However, as
discussed in Section II.B.3, Congress was skeptical of the substantiveness of the evidence
supporting this claim. See discussion infra Section II.B.3; see also Marko Milanovic, The
Soleimani Strike and Self-Defence Against an Imminent Armed Attack, EJIL: TALK! (Jan. 7,
2020),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-soleimani-strike-and-self-defence-against-animminent-armed-attack/ [https://perma.cc/NKA2-GKCL].
12. See Complaint at 8, Zaidan v. Trump, 317 F. Supp. 3d 8 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 17-581);
See Kate Clark, The Takhar Attack, AFG. ANALYSTS NETWORK 1 (2011).
13. See Natalino Ronzitti, The Report of the UN High-Level Panel and the Use of Force,
40 INT’L SPECTATOR 91, 93 (2005); see also NGO Statement on Reported Changes to U.S. Policy
on Use of Armed Drones and Other Lethal Force, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Mar. 8, 2018),
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/ngo-statement-reported-changes-uspolicy-use-armed-drones-and-other-lethal-force [https://perma.cc/YHY3-4XM6].
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States in manipulating the imminence requirement to advance
their own military objectives. Part III contends that a lack of US
accountability within the targeted drone strike program has
allowed the United States to violate its own interpretation of the
distinction principle of international humanitarian law, thereby
increasing the risk that innocent civilians will be nominated for the
US kill list and will be the target of a strike. Part IV of this Note
proposes solutions to these distinct problems. First, the United
States should stabilize its interpretation of Article 51’s imminence
requirement by adopting one definition of imminence for selfdefense analysis. Second, Congress should increase the
accountability of US officials involved in targeted killings through
legislation that increases the options of redress for victims of
targeted drone strikes.
II. A FLUCTUATING IMMINENCE APPLICATION IS DANGEROUS
FOREIGN POLICY
The United States has failed to assert a consistent
interpretation of imminence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
Therefore, the United States’ imminence analysis required for
determining whether it can resort to the use of force in self-defense
has taken many forms since the inception of targeted drone strikes
in 2001. Section II.A discusses the inception of Article 2(4) as well
as Article 51 of the UN Charter and its role in monitoring the use of
armed force in self-defense. It also explores the addition of an
imminence requirement into self-defense analysis. Section II.B
addresses how the United States has interpreted the imminence
requirement throughout the Bush, Obama, and Trump
administrations, and argues that each administration has adopted
its own concept of imminence in order to meet military objectives.
Section II.C highlights the risks to national security associated with
the United States’ refusal to define imminence clearly and
consistently.
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Legal Framework for Resorting to the Use of Force in SelfDefense
1. The Principle of Jus ad Bellum

Jus ad bellum dictates the criteria by which it is permissible
for States to resort to war or to the use of armed force more
generally.14 It is distinct from jus in bello, which governs the use of
force within an armed conflict.15 In drafting the UN Charter after
World War II, Member States sought to reduce the frequency of
war by restricting States’ rights to use force against one another.16
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits Member States “from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state.”17 Exceptions to Article 2(4) for the use
of cross-border force include use (1) with the consent of the host
state, (2) pursuant to the authorization of the UN Security Council,
or (3) in individual or collective self-defense.18 Article 51 explicitly
authorizes States to resort to force in national self-defense under
this third exception.19 Article 51 states that a nation shall be
permitted to act in self-defense “if an armed attack occurs.”20
Taken literally, Article 51’s right to self-defense prevents a State
from using force until after an armed attack is underway.21 This is
the theory most supported by European scholars of international
law.22 The United States, however, regards the right as
encompassing the inherent right of self-defense under customary
international law,23 which predates the UN Charter, and includes a
14. What are Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello?, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (Jan. 22,
2015),
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/what-are-jus-ad-bellum-and-jus-bello-0
[https://perma.cc/7YYZ-DEDL].
15. See JENNIFER ELSEA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL 75700 LEGAL ISSUES RELATED TO THE
LETHAL TARGETING OF U.S. CITIZENS SUSPECTED OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES 6 (2012).
16. See id.
17. U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
18. Monica Hakimi, The Jus ad Bellum’s Regulatory Form, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 151, 151
(2018).
19. Lynn E. Davis et al., Clarifying the Rules for Targeted Killing, RAND CORP. 3 (Sept. 8,
2016)
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1600/RR1610/R
AND_RR1610.pdf [https://perma.cc/AH4G-RT6C].
20. U.N. Charter art. 51.
21. See ELSEA, supra note 15, at 6.
22. See Ronzitti, supra note 13, at 93.
23. The inherent right of self-defense refers to a State’s right to protect its
sovereignty through the act of war. War could be either offensive or defensive in nature.
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right to anticipatory self-defense if there is an imminent threat of
attack.24
It is generally accepted by Member States of the United
Nations that the inherent right of self-defense under Article 51
allows the use of force in a nonconsenting State if that force meets
two conditions: necessity and proportionality.25 For example, if a
host State is willing and able to remove the threat from its
territory, the threatened State may not use force in the host
nation’s territory because it does not meet the necessity
Offensive war included avenging of a wrong done to the State by another and taking
punitive action so that future wrongs would be discouraged. Defensive war was for the
protection of the sovereign State against armed force and was equally justified for an
individual as it was for the State. Many early scholars considered the right to use war
defensively as a right to use defensive force before the self-defending State was attacked
or injured if it was immediate and necessary. See Murray Colin Alder, The Origin of
International Law of the Inherent Right of Self-Defence and Anticipatory Self-Defence, 2 W.
AUSTL. JURIST 107, 111-18 (2011).
24. Anticipatory self-defense allows a State to resort to force if an imminent threat of
attack clearly exists, preemptive self-defense permits a use of force on the mere possibility
of an attack at some unspecified, future period of time. There are two schools of thought
on whether Article 51 grants States the right to anticipatory self-defense. The restrictive
school believes that Article 51 does not grant States the right to use self-defense before the
attack occurs as stated literally in the text. The expansionist view is that Article 51 has not
abrogated the customary “inherent right” of self-defense that exists alongside the Charter
which allows a State to act in self-defense before an attack reaches its territory.
Expansionist scholars defend their view as being the more logical interpretation of the text
due to the increasing speed and destructive potential of modern weaponry. The beginnings
of the US adoption of the expansionist view are discussed in relation to the Caroline
incident in Section II.A.2. See O’Connell, supra note 8, at 42; JAMES A. GREEN, THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 97-98 (2009);
Patrick Kelly, Preemptive Self-Defense, Customary International Law, and the Congolese
Wars, E-INT’L RELS. (Sept. 3, 2016), https://www.e-ir.info/2016/09/03/preemptive-selfdefense-customary-international-law-and-the-congolesewars/#:~:text=Essentially%2C%20preemptive%20self%2Ddefense%20refers,a%20non
%2Dimminent%20security%20threat.&text=The%20claim%20of%20self%2Ddefense,fe
ature%20of%20international%20law%20however
[https://perma.cc/P5DT-WYTE];
V.A.V. Andreias, Anticipatory Self-Defense in International Law: Legal or Just a Construct for
Using Force?, Self Defence: Anticipatory Self Defense (Feb. 24, 2017),
https://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=122935 [https://perma.cc/J4X8-HNNB]; TOM RUYS,
“ARMED ATTACK” AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER: EVOLUTIONS IN CUSTOMARY LAW AND
PRACTICE 256-57 (Cambridge University Press 2010); see also discussion infra Section
II.A.2.
25. See Marty Lederman, ASIL Speech by State Legal Advisor Egan on International
Law
and
the
Use
of
Force
Against
ISIL
(Apr.
4,
2016),
https://www.justsecurity.org/30377/asil-speech-state-legal-adviser-international-lawbasis-for-limits-on-force-isil/ [https://perma.cc/C68L-9M8C]; See Adil Ahmad Haque,
Necessity and Proportionality in the Law of War, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON JUST WAR 1, 18 (Larry May ed. 2016).

2021]

WHO'S OFF LIMITS

113

requirement.26 The United States holds that in order to justify the
use of force without the consent of a host State, an invading State
must make a determination27 that the potential host State is
“unable or unwilling” to remove the threat from its territory
itself.28 “Unable” refers to a lack of military or legal capabilities to
eliminate the threat, and “unwilling” refers to a State’s refusal to
act and address the threat.29 Applying this standard, in 2014 the
United States sent a letter to the UN Security Council justifying
military intervention in Syria on the grounds that the Syrian
government was unable and unwilling to address terrorist threats
and that pursuant to the inherent right of self-defense under
Article 51 the United States was authorized to address this threat.30
The unable and unwilling doctrine is not universally accepted by
other nations.31 On February 24, 2021 Mexico informally arranged
a meeting of the UN National Security Council to discuss the issue,
and although the differing interpretations of Article 51 left the
Charter unaffected,32 Brazil, China, Mexico, and Sri Lanka
26. See Lederman, supra note 25.
27. There is not a standardized process for making this determination, but countries
customarily send a letter to the UN Security Council once they decide that the host State is
unwilling and unable to address the threat. See Elena Chako & Ashley Deeks, Which States
Support the “Unwilling and Unable” Test?, LAWFARE (Oct. 10, 2016, 1:55 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/which-states-support-unwilling-and-unable-test
[https://perma.cc/E9JY-Z78Q].
28. See GEN. COUNS. OF THE DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL
1066-67 (2016) [hereinafter DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL].
29. See Patryk I. Labuda, The Killing of Soleimani, the Use of Force Against Iraq and
Overlooked
Jus
Ad
Bellum
Questions,
EJIL: TALK! (Jan.
13, 2020),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-killing-of-soleimani-the-use-of-force-against-iraq-andoverlooked-ius-ad-bellum-questions/ [https://perma.cc/A26G-89UQ].
30. The Syrian government was either not able or would not eliminate ISIL safe
havens used for training, planning, financing, and carrying out attacks. See Permanent Rep.
of the U.S. to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 23, 2014 from the Permanent Rep. of the United
States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc.
S/2014/695l (Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3125705US-SYRIA-ISIL-9-23-2014.html [https://perma.cc/GGA7-L8BC]. In addition to the United
States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, Australia, and Turkey have all written
letters to the UN Security Council justifying their determinations to use military force
under an “unable or unwilling” theory. Such letters are not asking for permission to act
and were written after each nation has made an “unable or unwilling” determination. See
Chako & Deeks, supra note 27.
31. See Adil Ahmad Haque, Self-Defense Against Non-State Actors; All Over the Map,
JUST SEC. (Mar. 24, 2021), https://www.justsecurity.org/75487/self-defense-against-nonstate-actors-all-over-the-map/ [https://perma.cc/T5N5-ZGAH].
32. See id.
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categorically rejected the view that the UN Charter permits States
to use armed force in another State’s territory to eliminate the
threat of a non-State actor without the host State’s explicit
consent.33 However, many other States prescribe to the United
States’ interpretation of the UN Charter,34 asserting a broad right
to use force in self-defense against non-State actors in the territory
of another State.35
2. The Origin of Imminence in Article 51
“Imminence” is not written into Article 51.36 However, the
concept of imminence has historically been used to determine
whether the use of force in self-defense meets the “necessity”
prong of the right to self-defense under Article 51.37 It is nearly
universally accepted that the modern conception of imminence in
the use of force in self-defense developed following the Caroline
incident in 1837.38 In this incident, British troops crossed onto the
New York side of the Niagara River and attacked a private
American ship called the Caroline alleging that the ship was aiding
Canadian insurrectionists fighting against British rule.39 Outraged,
Secretary of State Daniel Webster stated that intrusion into the
territory of another State on the premise of self-defense is only
justified in “cases in which the necessity of that self-defence is
instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no
moment for deliberation.”40 Webster’s remarks imply that
temporality is relevant to an imminence analysis.41 Today,
however, the United States has long forgone an interpretation of
imminence requiring that the threat be instantaneous and has
33. See id.
34. Australia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, the Netherlands, Turkey, and
the United Kingdom all endorse the unable or unwilling theory, although distinctions
remain among these nations on the conditions under which it may apply. See id.
35. See id.
36. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Killing of Soleimani and International Law, EJIL:
TALK! (Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-killing-of-soleimani-and-internationallaw/ [https://perma.cc/B4VA-22UZ].
37. Lederman, supra note 25, at 3.
38. See Jeremy Wright, The Modern Law of Self-Defence, EJIL: TALK! (Jan. 11, 2017),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-modern-law-of-self-defence/
[https://perma.cc/V2DCJHXK].
39. See ELSEA, supra note 15, at 6.
40. Id. at 7.
41. See GREEN, supra note 24, at 96.
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since broadened this definition to allow the use of force in selfdefense in anticipation of an imminent attack.42 For example, in
1986 the United States used anticipatory force when it bombed
Libya in a “preemptive strike, directed against the Libyan terrorist
infrastructure” as a warning to Colonel Qadhafi to reevaluate his
role in exporting terror.43
B.

Expanding the Imminence Requirement to Meet Military
Objectives
1. 9/11 as a Turning Point

After a devastating attack on the nation in 2001, the United
States shifted its approach from broadening the concept of
imminence to viewing international law as a hindrance to US
national security.44 In the wake of the 9/11 crisis, then-Deputy
Assistant Attorney General John Yoo proclaimed in an Office of
Legal Counsel (“OLC”) memo that the text and structure of the
Constitution grant the President, as Commander-in-Chief and the
“sole organ” of US foreign relations power, complete authority to
use military force abroad.45 It stated, “[t]he power of the President
is at its zenith under the Constitution when the President is
directing military operations of the armed forces, because the
power of Commander in Chief is assigned solely to the President.”46
Additionally, Yoo argued that the President’s authority to resort to
military force after emergency situations such as the 9/11 terrorist
attacks is supported by past practices of the United States in
different but comparable circumstances.47 The memo claimed that

42. See ELSEA, supra note 15, at 7.
43. Letter from Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, to Strom Thurmond,
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, on
the
United
States
Air
Strike
against
Libya
(Apr.
16,
1986),
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/letter-speaker-house-representativesand-president-pro-tempore-senate-united-states [https://perma.cc/LPZ9-GE5A].
44. See Luca Trenta, The Obama Administration’s Conceptual Change: Imminence and
the Legitimation of Targeted Killings, 3 EUR. J. INT’L SEC. 69, 80 (2017).
45. See The President’s Const. Auth. to Conduct Mil. Operations Against Terrorists
and Nations Supporting Them, 25 Op. O.L.C. 188, 188 (2001).
46. Id. at 190.
47
For example, Yoo points out that the United States has employed Armed Forces out of the
country over 200 times, and 125 of those instances were done so by a President that was
acting without Congressional approval. See id. at 190, 201-02.

116

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:1

force can be used “both to retaliate for those attacks and to prevent
and deter future assaults” on the United States.48
Consistent with Yoo’s memo, the Bush administration
developed an aggressive strategy to confront terrorist threats
abroad.49 The new approach, titled the 2002 National Security
Strategy (“NSS”), focused on the preemption of future attacks that
called for self-defense not only against the threat of an imminent
attack, but against the mere possibility of an attack at some
unspecified, future period in time.50 The Bush administration
applied a significantly broader concept of imminence in its
counterterrorism efforts without ever concretely defining the
term.51 In his 2003 State of the Union Speech, President Bush
argued that waiting until a threat was imminent to exert force in
self-defense was accepting defeat.52
This mentality informed the administration’s policy on
targeted killings.53 While the Bush administration did not engage
in many drone strikes, it also did not set forth a specific legal
justification for the strikes it did carry out.54 The administration
maintained that since the United States was at war with al-Qaeda,
there were limited geographical or temporal restrictions on its
right to use force against the group.55 In essence, the Bush
administration did not redefine imminence from its previous
restrictive interpretation under the Caroline test, but simply
engaged in activity that suggested a significantly broader
48. See id. at 214.
49. See Trenta, supra note 44, at 80.
50. See THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002),
https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P9N7-J93]; GREEN, supra note 24, at 99.
51. See Trenta, supra note 44, at 80.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 82.
54. See id.
55. See id. It is significant that al-Qaeda is a non-State actor as opposed to a sovereign
nation, because an armed attack by a non-State actor can trigger a State’s right to resort to
force in self-defense inside of other countries. See Michael J. Adams & Ryan Goodman,
Category Mistake: There is no Jus ad Bellum for Use of Force Against Non-State Actors, JUST
SEC. (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/35482/category-mistake-jus-adbellum-force-non-state-actors/ [https://perma.cc/B8JR-U43G]; Contra Advisory Opinion
of the International Court of Justice on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall
in
the
Occupied
Palestinian
Territory,
U.N.
(2004),
https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-178825/ [https://perma.cc/UW8XR6PH].
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definition of imminence. This foreign policy aligned with US
military objectives in Iraq at the time.56 However, even initial
supporters of the Iraq war, such as the United Kingdom and
Australia, criticized the United States’ failure to define imminence
in making self-defense determinations under Article 51 both
during the war and later, noting that an imminence analysis is
essential to making decisions based on a theory of self-defense.57
In 2004 the UN High-Level Panel58 produced a report in part
addressing the dangers of unilateral force that may emerge from
blurring Article 51 in justifying the use of force in self-defense.59
The report categorically rejected the doctrine of preemptive selfdefense exercised by the Bush administration, emphasizing that an
attack must be imminent before resorting to the use of force in selfdefense.60
2. Broadening Imminence Under President Obama
The Obama administration applied a concept of imminence
narrower than the Bush administration’s application but broader
than what was permitted under the Caroline test, which was a

56. The Bush administration’s ground strategy in Iraq relied on calling for an
imminence interpretation that allowed the administration to fight terrorists and rogue
states through preemptive action without ever clearly defining imminence. See Luca
Trenta, Close up, Barack Obama’s Counter-Terrorism looks a lot like George W. Bush’s, THE
CONVERSATION (Jul. 4, 2014 11:24 AM), https://theconversation.com/close-up-barackobamas-counter-terrorism-looks-a-lot-like-george-w-bushs-28346
[https://perma.cc/6G3A-2SKU].
57. See Trenta, supra note 44, at 81.
58. In September 2003, Secretary General Kofi Annan announced to the General
Assembly his appointment of a High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. The
sixteen Panel members conducted an in-depth study on global threats and provided an
analysis of future challenges to peace and security. High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and
Change,
GLOB.
POL’Y
F.
(2005),
https://archive.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/226-initiatives/32369high-level-panel-on-threats-challenges-and-change.html [https://perma.cc/52TQ-GPKY].
59. There is a distinction between employing force unilaterally and the collective
authorization of the use of force with Security Council approval. Unilateral force presents
a greater threat to international peace and security because States interpret Article 51
differently and deciding to use force without any approval sets a precedent that such
action is acceptable and can lead to a greater frequency of resorting to force by other
States. See Marco Odello, Commentary on the United Nations’ High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change, 10 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 231, 233, 239-40 (2005).
60. See U.N. Secretary General, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change, ¶ 188, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
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guidepost for pre-9/11 interpretations of Article 51.61 Anwar alAulaqi was an American citizen who had been a successful imam62
in the United States throughout the 1990s and 2000s. In 2004, he
made his way to Yemen, and rising as a leader of al-Qaida, he
effectively motivated others to join the terrorist organization and
fight against the United States and the West.63 Al-Aulaqi was placed
on the United States government’s kill list64 in April of 2010.65 His
father learned of his son’s placement on the list and sued for both
injunctive and declaratory relief.66 The United States District Court
for the District of Columbia concluded that he did not have
standing to bring suit on his son’s behalf and deferred67 to the
government’s rationale of national security to support al-Aulaqi’s
placement on the kill list.68 On September 30, 2011, al-Aulaqi was
killed by a US drone strike, along with Pakistani-American Samir
Khan, who produced Inspire, an English-language online magazine
for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (“AQAP”) promoting
terrorism.69
61. DEP’T OF JUST., WHITE PAPER, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST
U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE
(2011) [hereinafter DEP’T OF JUST. WHITE PAPER]; see also Wright, supra note 38.
62. An imam is a Muslim individual who leads worshippers in prayer, and is
universally referred to as a leader of Muslim communities. See Adam Zeidan, Imam,
BRITANNICA (last updated Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.britannica.com/topic/imam
[https://perma.cc/4VL6-NTLF].
63. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 8, 12 (D.D.C 2010); see also Karen J.
Greenberg, Citizenship in America: A Country’s “Priceless Treasure” Under Siege, THE
CENTURY FOUND. (Oct. 24, 2019), https://tcf.org/content/report/citizenship-americacountrys-priceless-treasure-siege/?session=1 [https://perma.cc/YQ8T-GFBE].
64. Also known as the “disposition matrix,” the “kill list” is a complex grid of
suspected terrorists to be traced and then targeted in drone strikes or captured and
interrogated. See Ian Comabain, Obama’s Secret Kill List – the Disposition Matrix, THE
GUARDIAN
(Jul.
14,
2013,
2:00
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/14/obama-secret-kill-list-dispositionmatrix [https://perma.cc/UJ9P-HLG7].
65. Melanie J. Foreman, Comment, When Targeted Killing is Not Permissible: An
Evaluation of Targeted Killing Under the Laws of War and Morality, 15 UNIV. PA. J. CONST. L.
921, 925 (2013).
66. See Greenberg, supra note 63.
67. The court held, among other reasons, that the plaintiff Nassar al-Aulaqi lacked
standing because he did not provide an adequate explanation of why Anwar al-Aulaqi
could not have brought the claim himself. The National Security Law Podcast, Episode 88:
A Deep Dive into the Anwar al-Awlaki Case(s) (Aug. 28, 2018),
https://www.nationalsecuritylawpodcast.com/tag/targeted-killing/#
[https://perma.cc/5GPU-Q6TX].
68. See Greenberg, supra note 63.
69. See Anwar al-Awlaki Killed in Yemen – As it Happened, supra note 7.
A
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In an OLC memorandum authored by David Barron, thenActing Assistant Attorney General heading the OLC, the United
States articulated the legal authorization on which it relied to
target and kill al-Aulaqi.70 The memorandum was explicit that
high-level US government officials concluded that al-Aulaqi posed
a “continued and imminent threat” to the lives of American
citizens, therefore killing him was an act of self-defense sanctioned
by Article 51 of the UN Charter.71 The administration based their
conclusion on al-Aulaqi’s involvement in both operational and
leadership roles in AQAP and continued attempt to plot attacks to
kill Americans from Yemen.72 The killing of al-Aulaqi under a
continued and imminent threat standard is significant because it
suggested that self-defense may be exercised independent of an
armed attack by a State and can be applied to a threat posed by a
non-State actor.73
After the killing of al-Aulaqi, the Obama administration
committed to its broadened interpretation of imminence. In
September of 2011, then-Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism, John Brennan, argued for a more
flexible understanding of imminence74 due to the modern-day
capabilities, techniques, and technological innovations available to
terrorist non-State actors.75 Later, in March of 2012, Attorney
General Eric Holder proposed that the current requirement for
imminence was more akin to a “window of opportunity” for using
force, rather than acting on the perceived immediacy of the threat
of an armed attack.76 In a 2016 speech to the American Society of
International Law (“ASIL”), State Department Legal Advisor Brian
70. See Applicability of Federal Criminal Laws and the Constitution to Contemplated
Lethal Operations Against Shaykh Anwar al-Aulaqi, Op. O.L.C. 12, 12-41 (2010)
[hereinafter Barron Memorandum].
71. Id. at 21.
72. See id.
73. See O’Connell, supra note 8.
74. This is alluding to the need to expand the conception of imminence beyond the
Caroline test applied in more traditional warfare because current threats to national
security such as al-Qaida are plotting attacks that are not as easily discernable since they
do not wear unforms, carry arms openly, or mass its troops at the borders of the nations
they attack. See John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. and
Counterterrorism, Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values And Laws,
Program on Law and Security (Sept. 16, 2011).
75. Id.
76. Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., Speech at Northwestern School of Law
(Mar. 5. 2012); ELSEA, supra note 15, at 20.
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Egan maintained that the United States may exercise its inherent
right of self-defense not only in response to armed attacks that
have occurred, but also preemptively to address imminent attacks
before they occur.77
To determine imminence, the speech continued, a variety of
factors must be weighed.78 These factors include:
[1] the nature and immediacy of the threat; [2] the probability
of an attack; [3] whether the anticipated attack is part of a
concerted pattern of continuing armed activity; [4] the likely
scale of the attack and the injury, loss, or damage likely to
result therefrom in the absence of mitigating action; and [5]
the likelihood that there will be other opportunities to
undertake effective action in self-defense that may be
expected to cause less serious collateral injury, loss, or
damage.79

Moreover, the speech noted the United States’ position that
the absence of specific evidence of where an attack will take place
or of the precise nature of an attack does not preclude the United
States from concluding that an armed attack is imminent for
purposes of employing self-defense, provided that there is a
reasonable and objective basis for concluding that an armed attack
is imminent.80 Additionally, these remarks reiterated comments
made by John Brennan that the United States has “the authority to
take action against al-Qa’ida and its associated forces without
doing a separate self-defense analysis each time.”81
Following this view, once a State has lawfully resorted to selfdefense against a particular armed group following an imminent
threat of armed attack by that group, it is not necessary under jus
ad bellum to reassess whether an armed attack is imminent prior
to every subsequent action taken against that group.82 In essence,
the Obama administration differentiated itself from President
Bush’s global “War on Terror” where imminence was not defined

77. See Brian J. Egan, Legal Advisor, U.S. State Dep’t, International Law, Legal
Diplomacy, and the Counter-ISIL Campaign, American Society of International Law (Apr.
1, 2016).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. Brennan, supra note 74.
82. See Egan, supra note 77, at 239.
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for strategic purposes83 by underscoring imminence as a
requirement in a self-defense analysis. However, the legal
framework set out by the Obama administration was highly
aligned with Bush’s preemptive self-defense in that no specific
evidence of a threat was necessary to resort to the use of force, and
that no self-defense analysis was required at all after a
determination was made that an imminent attack existed.
3. The Case of Qasem Soleimani: Manipulating Imminence to
Achieve Foreign Policy Objectives
The most recent notable application of the United States’
broadened imminence interpretation is the targeted killing of the
highly influential and revered Iranian General Qasem Soleimani
under the Trump administration.84 The Department of Defense
attributed the deaths of hundreds of American and coalition85
service members to Soleimani and regarded him as an orchestrator
of attacks on coalition bases across Iraq, which killed and wounded
additional American and Iraqi personnel in the months leading up
to his killing.86 Additionally, according to the Department of
Defense, Soleimani approved attacks on the US embassy in
Baghdad the week he was killed.87 On January 3, 2020, Secretary of
State Mike Pompeo tweeted that the decision to kill Soleimani was
made “in response to imminent threats to American lives.”88 On
January 9, 2020 Secretary Pompeo reaffirmed the administration’s
imminent threat justification on Fox News stating that Soleimani

83. See discussion supra Section II.B.1.
84. See The Inquiry, Why was Qasem Soleimani killed?, BBC WORLD SERV. (Jan. 8, 2020)
(downloaded using Spotify).
85. Coalitions are temporary multinational understandings that develop in order to
complete a specific mission and disband once the task is complete. See Patricia A.
Weitsman, Wartime Alliances Versus Coalition Warfare: How Institutional Structure Matters
in the Multilateral Prosecution of Wars, 2 AIR & SPACE POWER J. AFR. & FRANCOPHONIE 29, 31
(2011).
86. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Statement by the Dep’t of Def. (Jan 2, 2020)
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2049534/statementby-the-department-of-defense/ [https://perma.cc/G3VV-6UBK].
87. See id.
88. Secretary Pompeo (@SecPompeo), TWITTER (Jan. 3, 2020, 6:41 AM),
https://twitter.com/secpompeo/status/1213062846021558273?lang=en
[https://perma.cc/L4QB-AVBR].
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was plotting numerous imminent attacks.89 He conceded, however,
that US intelligence does not indicate precisely when or where the
attacks are meant to take place.90 According to the imminence
standard stated by the Obama administration, this lack of specific
evidence is not preclusive to categorizing the threat as imminent.91
It is relevant to evaluate the five factors put forth under the
Obama administration for determining imminence in this case.
Unfortunately, while the United States has set forth factors for
determining imminence, it has not expounded on the metrics used
to determine if these factors are satisfied.92 It is also unclear if
these factors were actually used by the Trump administration in its
imminence analysis for the killing of Soleimani.93 Nevertheless, it
is useful to discuss these factors because the Trump
administration’s failure to satisfy them suggests a greater
broadening of the imminence requirement beyond the Obama
administration’s expansion.94
The first factor is the nature and immediacy of the threat,95
which is best analyzed in the context of Soleimani and Iran’s
history.96 The “nature” of this threat can be understood through
the lens of one United States official, who, just days before the
strike that killed Soleimani, reported “a normal Monday in the
Middle East” and that Soleimani’s travels were “business as usual,”

89. Chris Cameron & Helene Cooper, The Trump Administration’s Fluctuating
(July
9,
2020),
Explanations
for
the
Suleimani
Strike,
N.Y. TIMES
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/12/us/politics/trump-suleimani-explanations.html
[https://perma.cc/KB7C-3K9U].
90. Id.
91. See Brennan, supra note 74.
92. See discussion supra Section II.B.2.
93. See David Welna, ‘Imminent’ threat – Trump Attack on Iranian General – Is
Undefined,
NPR
(Jan.
10,
2020,
7:16
PM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/01/10/795438264/imminent-threat-trump-justification-ofattack-on-iranian-general-is-undefined [https://perma.cc/53S2-8HER]; Matthew C.
Waxman, Dis Soleimani Pose an Imminent Threat? COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Jan. 15, 2020,
9:00
AM),
https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/did-soleimani-pose-imminent-threat
[https://perma.cc/L24D-KCDL].
94. See discussion infra Section II.B.3.
95. See Egan, supra note 77, at 239.
96. See Rebecca Ingber, If There Was No “imminent” Attack from Iran, Killing
POST
(Jan
15.
2020,
12:19
PM),
Soleimani
Was
Illegal,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/01/15/if-there-was-no-imminentattack-iran-killing-soleimani-was-illegal/ [https://perma.cc/TND6-C3MW].
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in no way signaling an immediate threat.97 Notably, the official said
that Soleimani’s attack was not imminent because Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei, as the Supreme Leader of Iran, had final authority on
approving the general’s attack and had not yet done so.98 This
seriously calls into question the “immediacy” of the attack as
required by the first factor in the Obama administration’s
imminence analysis.
The lack of a decision by the Ayatollah also speaks to the
second factor in the imminence determination: the probability of
an attack.99 Because Iran had failed to commit to a particular
course of action, the probability of an attack was nebulous.100
While President Trump told reporters that “Soleimani was plotting
imminent and sinister attacks on American diplomats and military
personnel,”101 a senior State Department official stated, “[w]hether
the specific plots that [Soleimani] has unleashed were so far
advanced that they may be able to carry them out, I don’t know.”102
While Soleimani was in contact with persons involved in plotting
attacks, Congress did not receive convincing evidence that such
plots would be carried out.103
The Trump administration’s presumed argument on the third
factor—whether the anticipated attack is part of a concerted
pattern of continuing armed activity104—also falls short. Soleimani
was responsible for the deaths of hundreds of American troops as
97. Helene Cooper et al., As Tensions with Iran Escalated, Trump Opted for Most
Extreme
Measure,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
4,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/04/us/politics/trumpsuleimani.html?campaign_id=60&instance_id=0&segment_id=20060&user_id=285e0687
bd79f5610c20b52d37875ff8&regi_id=47276260 [https://perma.cc/J88N-GZJN].
98. See id. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps is a branch of the Iranian military that
was led by Commander Soleimani and reported directly to the Supreme Leader. See Miriam
Berger, What is Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps that Soleimani Helped to Lead?, WASH.
POST (Jan. 4, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/01/04/what-isirans-revolutionary-guard-corps-that-soleimani-helped-lead/ [https://perma.cc/QR97PTM7]; Milanovic, supra note 11.
99. See Egan, supra note 77, at 239.
100. See Milanovic, supra note 11.
101. Mark Hosenball, Trump says Soleimani plotted “imminent” attacks, but critics
(Jan.
3,
2020,
5:56
PM),
question
just
how
soon,
REUTERS
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-blast-intelligence/trump-sayssoleimani-plotted-imminent-attacks-but-critics-question-just-how-soonidUSKBN1Z228N [https://perma.cc/3Q75-Z6L2].
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Egan, supra note 77, at 5.
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they battled Iranian-backed Shia militias in Iraq.105 Soleimani’s
involvement in these deaths was evident for many years through
both the Bush and Obama administrations.106 US Ambassador to
the United Nations Kelly Craft suggested in a letter to the United
Nations that Iran’s past actions justified the strike, stating that
these actions were in response to an “escalating series of armed
attacks” by Iran and Iran-supported militias on US forces.107
However, Soleimani’s past involvement in human rights violations
or acts of terror against the United States are not sufficient to make
his killing lawful.108 Ambassador Craft stated in her letter that the
United States was responding to a series of armed attacks by Iran.
The use of the word “series” suggests that each attack was discrete
and there was no one continuous armed activity for purposes of
satisfying factor three.109 Although John Brennan suggests that a
separate self-defense analysis is not necessary each time the
United States would like to use force,110 such an interpretation is
impermissibly broad and contradicts the spirit of Article 51 as an
exception to an overall ban on the use of force.111 The more logical
reading of Article 51 is that if one attack is clearly over, then legal
analysis must be renewed for subsequent use of force in self-

105. See The Daily, The Killing of General Qassim Suleimani, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2020)
(downloaded using Spotify).
106. Id.
107. Letter from Ambassador Kelly Craft, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, to
Ambassador Dang Dinh Quy, President of the United Nations Sec. Council (Jan. 8, 2020)
https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/united-states-article-51letter-soleimani.pdf [https://perma.cc/F92D-6M2Y] [hereinafter Letter from Ambassador
Kelly Craft].
108. The UN Charter prohibits the use of armed force except to (1) repel an ongoing
attack or (2) to halt an imminent armed attack. By stating that the United States was
responding to a series of armed attacks, Ambassador Craft was conceding (1) that the
United States was not facing one ongoing attack and (2) that there was no attack to halt,
since it already occurred. See Agnes Callamard, The Targeted Killing of General Soleimani:
SEC.
(Jan.
8,
2020),
Its
Lawfulness
and
Why
it
Matters,
JUST
https://www.justsecurity.org/67949/the-targeted-killing-of-general-soleimani-itslawfulness-and-why-it-matters/ [https://perma.cc/6PY3-8HSW]; See Adil Ahmad Haque,
U.S. Legal Defense of the Soleimani Strike at the United Nations: A Critical Assessment, JUST
SEC. (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/68008/u-s-legal-defense-of-thesoleimani-strike-at-the-united-nations-a-critical-assessment/ [https://perma.cc/H9TFTB8N].
109. See Haque, supra note 108; Egan, supra note 77, at 5.
110. See Brennan, supra note 74.
111. See O’Connell, supra note 36.
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defense.112 If no further attack is imminent, then there is nothing
in which to lawfully defend.113 Otherwise, responding to the attack
is not a matter of self-defense, but rather retaliation,114 which is
unambiguously prohibited by Article 2(4).115
Additionally, the Trump administration seemed to consider
any use of armed force as equivalent to an “armed attack” for
purposes of resorting to force in self-defense under Article 51.116
This is a broad interpretation of the definition of an “armed
attack.”117 For example, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”)118
distinguishes the “most grave” uses of force from “other less grave
forms”, in order to determine the status of an armed attack,
implying that the gravity of the force is essential to its
categorization as an armed attack.119 Therefore, according to the
ICJ interpretation, the shooting down of a US aircraft on June 19,
2019 referenced in the UN letter from Ambassador Craft likely
does not amount to an “armed attack” as is claimed.120 It does not
reach the level of gravity necessary to be considered as such,
specifically because the aircraft was unmanned and shot down in
Iranian airspace.121
The fourth factor to consider is the likely scale of the attack
and the injury, loss, or damage expected to result therefrom in the
112. See Haque, supra note 108.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
116. See Letter from Ambassador Kelly Craft, supra note 107; U.N. Charter art. 51.
117. See Haque, supra note 108.
118. The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations. See The Court, INT’L CT. JUST., https://www.icj-cij.org/en/court
[https://perma.cc/JM2V-G58S] (last visited Sept. 5, 2020).
119. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 195 (June 27); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J.
¶ 51 (Nov. 6).
120. See Letter from Ambassador Kelly Craft, supra note 107; See Haque, supra note
108; Rebecca Ingber, If There was no “imminent” Attack from Iran, Killing Soleimani was
POST
(Jan
15.
2020,
12:19
PM),
Illegal,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/01/15/if-there-was-no-imminentattack-iran-killing-soleimani-was-illegal/ [https://perma.cc/R3KF-P4NY].
121. The Nicaragua opinion differentiates an armed attack from other uses of force
by highlighting that the sending of armed forces or equivalent of armed forces by a State
across international borders into another State is a requisite for an armed attack. Iran was
within its own borders and the scale of the attack was such that no life was lost. See
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment,
1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 195 (June 27); Haque, supra note 108; Ingber, supra note 120.
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absence of mitigating action.122 Trump administration officials
claimed that Soleimani was engaged in planning an imminent
attack that would put US lives at risk.123 President Trump said in a
January 10, 2020 interview that he believed Soleimani was
planning “large-scale attacks” on four embassies.124 Both of these
assertions have been disputed.125 Members of Congress have
challenged the evidence presented regarding the risk to US lives
and Secretary of Defense Mark Esper contradicted President
Trump’s claim, stating he never saw any specific evidence that Iran
was planning an attack on four American embassies.126
The last factor in the Obama administration’s imminence
analysis is the likelihood that there will be other opportunities to
undertake effective action in self-defense that may be expected to
cause less serious collateral injury, loss, or damage.127 Here,
Soleimani’s location of death, Iraq, and position as a military
commander of a different sovereign state, Iran, is consequential.
Iraq’s removal of the threat or US cooperation with Iraq would
likely have lessened the injury and collateral damage resulting
from the drone strike.128 Yet the strike against Soleimani took place
in Iraqi territory seemingly without the consent of the Iraqi
government.129 While there is information suggesting that in
December 2019 the United States requested that Iraq take action
against Kata’ib Hezbollah, an Iraqi proxy group,130 no evidence has

122. See Egan, supra note 77, at 239.
123. See CLAYTON THOMAS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46148, U.S KILLING OF QASEM SOLEIMANI:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 2 (2020).
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.; Cameron & Cooper, supra note 89.
127. See Egan, supra note 77, at 239.
128. The strike killed five Iraqi nationals, including the leader and members of
Kata’ib Hezbollah. See Labuda, supra note 29.
129. See Milanovic, supra note 11.
130. Proxy groups are defined as armed third parties, State or non-State actors that
are supported by a State and that engage in hostilities to achieve the supporting State’s
objectives. Kata’ib Hezbollah is a Shia Iraqi insurgent group that directs a majority of its
attacks on US coalition forces in Iraq and receives training, logistical support, and weapons
from Iran. See Brittany Benowitz & Tommy Ross, Time to get a Handle on America’s Conduct
of Proxy Warfare, LAWFARE (Apr. 9, 2020, 11:21 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/timeget-handle-americas-conduct-proxy-warfare [https://perma.cc/YKR2-LJTV]. Ctr. for Int’l
Sec. & Coop., Kata’ib Hezbollah: Overview, STAN. UNIV. CTR. FOR INT’L SEC. & COOP.,
https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/kataibhezbollah#text_block_24071 [https://perma.cc/BA8K-UMN5] (last visited Apr. 1, 2021).
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been provided that Iraq was consulted on how to alleviate any
threats posed to the United States arising from the visit of General
Soleimani.131 Further, no evidence has been produced that the
United States did not have time to seek aid from the international
community in addressing this alleged threat.132
In order to justify the strike without Iraq’s consent, the United
States would have to prove that it could not have asked the Iraqi
government for consent under an “unable or unwilling” standard
because of Iraq’s collusion with Iran.133 This theory is not
completely unfounded, as Iran’s control of Iraqi proxy groups
makes it debatable whether the Iraqi government and its leaders
could have actually made decisions free from Iranian influence.134
However, the standard’s application in this instance is
untenable.135 First, the unable or unwilling theory is traditionally
applied to non-State actors, due to the high-risk political nature of
applying it to a State-actor.136 Soleimani was an Iranian Stateactor.137 The targeting of prominent individuals, such as heads of
State, usually classifies as an assassination.138 However,
Soleimani’s classification is more opaque because while he was a
military officer, he had direct involvement with and was
supportive of a non-State terrorist organization.139 While
131. See Agnes Callamard (Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions), Use of Armed Drones for Targeted Killing, ¶ 82, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/44/38
(Jun.
29,
2020),
https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/44/38
[https://perma.cc/BT2D-G2UU].
132. Although Article 51 does not require a State to wait for the UN Security Council
to take measures before invoking the inherent right of self-defense, it is possible consulting
the international community would have been an alternate effective measure under factor
five to address the purported threat. See U.N. Charter art. 51; Callamard, supra note 131.
133. See Milanovic, supra note 11
134. See Labuda, supra note 29.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. Stephanie Nebehay, U.N. Expert Deems U.S. Drone Strike on Iran’s Soleimani an
‘Unlawful’ Killing, REUTERS (Jul. 6, 2020, 5:29 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-iran-un-rights/u-n-expert-deems-u-s-drone-strike-on-irans-soleimani-an-unlawfulkilling-idUSKBN2472TW [https://perma.cc/QM4J-97UH]; Archit Shukla, The Killing of
General Soleimani – A Blatant Violation of International Law, JURIST (Apr. 14, 2020, 3:01
PM),
https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2020/04/archit-shukla-general-soleimaniinternational-law/ [https://perma.cc/2Z83-H947].
138. See Thomas Byron Hunter, Targeted Killing: Self-Defense, Preemption, and the
War on Terrorism, 2 J. STRATEGIC SEC., 1, 11 (2009).
139. See id. at 4; See Peter Knoope, Soleimani’s Death: Can State-Actors Also be
SPECTATOR
(Jan.
8,
2020,
3:58
PM),
Terrorists?,
CLINGENDAEL
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Soleimani was a State-actor in Iran, his status as a State-actor in
Iraq may be disputed. He was listed as a terrorist (i.e., a non-State
actor) in the United States and on a list of “persons, groups and
entities subject to application of specific measures to combat
terrorism” in the European Union.140 Nevertheless, Soleimani’s
quasi-State-actor status significantly increases the political stakes
and calls into question the appropriateness of applying an unable
and unwilling standard.141 Second, the fact that a State is not
immediately able to terminate terrorist activities within its
borders does not sufficiently justify bombing that State’s territory
without its consent, as was done in this case.142 Abiding by such a
low threshold should be considered an abuse of military action
against the will of Iraq, compromising their sovereignty simply
because the government was not fighting terrorism within their
borders to the satisfaction of US standards.143
The Trump administration ultimately distanced itself from its
initial imminence determination and justification for the strike on
Soleimani.144 However, the remarks of the President as well as
those of high-ranking US military and State officials signifies an
application of the broadest imminence interpretation for a
targeted killing to date. The Trump administration killed a highranking, celebrated State-actor in a sovereign state of which he was
not a citizen without consent and without definitive intelligence on
when and where an attack would take place or the nature of the
attack.
https://spectator.clingendael.org/en/publication/soleimanis-death-can-state-actorsalso-be-terrorists [https://perma.cc/3MEZ-REMF].
140. See Hunter, supra note 138, at 1.
141. See Labuda, supra note 29.
142. See A Plea Against the Abusive Invocation of Self-Defence as a Response to
Terrorism, ULB CTR. INT’L L., http://cdi.ulb.ac.be/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/A-pleaagainst-the-abusive-invocation-of-self-defence.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GTF-HYYN] (last
visited Feb. 24, 2021).
143. See id.
144. After multiple claims by Trump officials and President Trump himself that the
justification for targeting and killing General Soleimani was the imminent threat he posed
to US lives, the official White House Report the Trump administration sent to Congress has
no mention of imminence, focusing instead on the President’s authority under Article II of
the Constitution and the 2002 AUMF to justify the strike. See Zachary Cohen & Sam Fossum,
“Imminent threat” Explanation Noticeably Absent in White House Report Justifying Soleimani
POLITICS
(Feb.
14,
2020,
5:24
PM),
Strike,
CNN
https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/14/politics/trump-soleimani-strike-legaljustification/index.html [https://perma.cc/6LWC-GHN3].
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Repercussions of an Inconsistent Imminence Interpretation

The Bush administration failed to define imminence in its
drone strike determinations.145 The Obama administration put
forth factors to determine whether a threat is imminent for the use
of force in self-defense.146 The Trump administration seemingly
expanded the Obama administration’s interpretation of
imminence when it targeted and killed General Soleimani without
properly weighing the factors the Obama administration put in
place. 147While the Biden administration may very well revert to
the Obama administration’s protocols for imminence analysis, this
is currently unclear.148 The merits and disadvantages of a broad
imminence interpretation are worth serious debate. However, the
larger threat to American national security is not the definition of
imminence generally, but the inconsistent application of
imminence by each administration.
The US response to terrorism influences every other nation’s
conduct in similar circumstances.149 Several nations utilize drone
strikes and targeted killing in their counterterrorism approach.150
The number of countries that possess military drones has
skyrocketed since 2010, with nearly 100 countries now in
possession of the technology.151 More significantly, it is evident
that some of these countries are following the example set by the
United States in justifying their use of force.152 In 2015 the Islamic
145. See discussion supra Section II.B.1.
146. See discussion supra Section II.B.2.
147. See discussion supra Section II.B.3.
148. The Biden administration suspended the Trump Administration’s drone policy
rules on the first day of office. The administration continues to review both Trump and
Obama era policies in a process that was initially supposed to last sixty days but is now
expected to last six months. See Charlie Savage, Trump’s Secret Rules for Drone Strikes
Outside of War Zones are Disclosed, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/01/us/politics/trump-drone-strike-rules.html
[https://perma.cc/NRU8-9YRQ].
149. Frequently
Asked
Questions
About
Targeted
Killings,
ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/other/frequently-asked-questions-about-targeting-killing
[https://perma.cc/5UDK-MEXZ] (last visited Dec. 8, 2020).
150. See Trenta, supra note 44, at 70.
151. See Ryan Pickrell, Nearly 100 Countries Have military Drones and its Changing
the Way the World Prepares For War, BUS. INSIDER (Sept 27, 2019),
https://www.businessinsider.com/world-rethinks-war-as-nearly-100-countries-fieldmilitary-drones-2019-9 [https://perma.cc/9DDH-SVBC].
152. See infra, footnotes 153-160 and accompanying text; see also Marc Weller,
Permanent Imminence of Armed Attacks: Resolution 2249 (2015) and the Right to Self
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State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) bombed a Russian jetliner over the
Sinai Desert and attacked a Paris stadium and concert hall.153
These attacks killed and injured over 824 nationals of Russia,
France, and twenty-two other countries.154 In response to these
attacks, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution
2249,155 which permitted the use of force against ISIS non-State
actors in Syria.156 The French Security Council Representative who
sponsored the resolution voiced that he voted in favor of it because
it permitted collective action based on the Article 51 self-defense
and imminence provision of the UN Charter.157 This resolution was
more closely aligned with the United States’ Article 51
interpretation rather than the ICJ’s.
While the ICJ has
systematically rejected a reading of Article 51 that permitted the
use of force against non-State actors unless the attack can be
attributed to a territorial State,158 since 9/11 the United States has
relied on self-defense and imminence analysis to address terrorist
non-State actors.159 Additionally, in 2017 the UK Attorney General
explicitly adopted the imminence factors that the Obama
administration laid out in Brian Egan’s 2016 speech.160
Despite this influence, the United States has not yet solidified
a definition of imminence.161 Without a defined set of principles to
Defence Against Designated Terrorist Groups, EJIL: TALK! (Nov. 25, 2015),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/permanent-imminence-of-armed-attacks-resolution-22492015-and-the-right-to-self-defence-against-designated-terrorist-groups/
[https://perma.cc/J2N8-56PB].
153. Michael P. Scharf, How the War Against ISIS Changed International Law, 48 CASE
W. RSRV. J. INT’L L. 1, 50 (2016).
154. Id.
155. Resolution 2249 determined that ISIS is a “global and unprecedented threat,”
and that member States of the UN should take “necessary measures” in compliance with
international law and the UN Charter to prevent and suppress terrorist acts. See S.C. Res.
224, (Nov. 20, 2015); see also Scharf, supra note 153.
156. See Scharf, supra note 153, at 51.
157. See id. at 50.
158. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgement, 1986 I.C.J Rep. 14, ¶ 191 (June 27); see also Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.),
Judgement, 2003 I.C.J. 161 ¶ 195-96 (Nov. 6); Legal Consequences of the construction of a
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J 136 (July 9); Scharf, supra note 153,
at 40.
159. See Barron Memorandum, supra note 70, at 21, 27-28 n.36, 40-44.
160. See Trenta, supra note 44, at 89.
161. This refers to each US administration applying a unique imminence analysis for
purposes of resorting to the use of force in self-defense. See Trenta, supra note 44, at 80;
See also Egan, supra note 77, at 239; Secretary Pompeo (@SecPompeo), TWITTER (Jan. 3,
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adhere to in an imminence analysis, the US justification for
carrying out drone strikes under Article 51 is practically
boundless. At least one scholar posits that if the United States
“continue[s] to justify such practices in only the vaguest of terms,
we should expect other countries to take them up—and almost
certainly in ways we will not find to our liking.”162 This presents a
serious risk that self-defense will become an alibi that is
systematically used to justify unilateral military operations around
the world.163 If the United States does not adhere to a
predetermined standard, other nations may not feel compelled to
either. While in most instances States only resort to an imminence
analysis under Article 51 due to serious national security threats
and not ad hoc power grabs, the United States failure to concretely
define imminence invites other nations to likewise interpret
Article 51 as they see fit to advance military objectives. This
scenario invites not just a short-term risk of reciprocity, but a longterm risk that the United States or its allies will fall victim to an
attack that is impossible to predict yet purportedly complying with
Article 51.
III. US ACCOUNTABILITY PROCEDURES ARE DEFICIENT TO
ENSURE THAT THE US COMPLIES WITH THE DISTINCTION
PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
While the United States has thorough protocols in place to
sustain accountability and aid in compliance of international
humanitarian law, these protocols have not been wholly effective
in ensuring that civilians are not the object of attack and such
protocols have been threatened altogether by the Trump
administration. Section III.A introduces the principle of jus in bello
and the elements within jus in bello that must be adhered to by
those involved in armed conflict. This Part particularly focuses on
the element of distinction in jus in bello and the United States’
2020,
6:41
AM),
https://twitter.com/secpompeo/status/1213062846021558273?lang=en
[https://perma.cc/XN5L-Y6HQ].
162. See David Cole, A Secret License to Kill, THE N.Y. REV. (Sept. 11, 2011),
https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2011/09/19/secret-license-kill/
[https://perma.cc/X56E-QU2D].
163. See A Plea Against the Abusive Invocation of Self-Defence as a Response to
Terrorism, supra note 142.
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interpretation of it. Section III.B. argues that the US procedures for
nominating individuals to the kill list and properly verifying such
targets before they are killed do not ensure that a civilian will not
be the object of attack and therefore do not adequately comply
with jus in bello. This Part also addresses the Trump
administration’s rollback of protocols put in place by previous
administrations to better comply with jus in bello.
A.

Legal Framework of International Humanitarian Law
1. The Principle of Jus in Bello

Assuming that the United States is engaged in an armed
conflict under jus ad bellum,164 the analysis turns to jus in bello. Jus
in bello regulates the conduct of parties engaged in an armed
conflict.165 It is generally accepted by UN Member States that
international humanitarian law is synonymous with jus in bello,
which seeks to minimize suffering in armed conflicts by protecting
and assisting all victims of armed conflict.166 Jus in bello requires
that any use of violence or military force by a State meet the
requirements of distinction, proportionality, humanity, and
military necessity.167 Distinction maintains that civilians may not
be the object of an attack.168 Proportionality prohibits attacks that
would cause excessive harm to civilians in relation to the attacking
state’s military advantage.169 Humanity requires the consideration
of people’s security and health in the attack.170 Military necessity is
that which is required in order to achieve the earliest submission
of the enemy at the earliest possible moment with the minimum
expenditure of life and resources.171
164. Jus ad bellum refers to the conditions under which States may resort to war or
to the use of armed force in general. See What are Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello?, supra note
14.
165. See id.
166. Id.
167. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION CLINIC OF STANFORD LAW
SCHOOL & GLOBAL JUSTICE CLINIC AT NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, LIVING UNDER
DRONES: DEATH, INJURY, AND TRAUMA TO CIVILIANS FROM US DRONE PRACTICES IN PAKISTAN 112
(2012).
168. Davis et al., supra note 19, at 7.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Nils Melzer, Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in
Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (2009),
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Jus in bello dictates that there are two ways to be classified as
a legal target of war.172 One way is through direct participation in
hostilities.173 The other way is to be a combatant.174 Combatants
are individuals who are either members of the armed forces of a
state party to the conflict or part of an armed group under
responsible command, wearing fixed, distinctive insignia, carrying
their arms openly, and conducting their operations in accordance
with the laws and customs of war.175 Lawful combatants can legally
kill or be killed by other lawful combatants.176 Alternatively, a
civilian farmer who arms himself and fights would, for example, be
directly participating in hostilities and become a legitimate target
for the duration of that specific act.177 The International Committee
of the Red Cross (“ICRC”)178 interprets the concept to only include
activities that resemble those of a fighter, or conduct that directly
supports combat,179 and excludes more distant acts, such as
providing financial support, advocacy, or other non-combat aid.180
The United States, however, leaves open for discretion whether a
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R48J-8YQ9].
172. See Vivek Sehrawat, Legal Status of Drones Under LOAC and International Law, 5
PENN STATE J. L. & INT’L AFF., 165, 194 (2017).
173. See id.
174. Civilian non-combatants are never legal targets of war. See id.
175. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 12,
1949 (providing the definition).
176. See Mike Dryfus, My Fellow Americans, We Are Going to Kill You: The Legality of
Targeting and Killing U.S. Citizens Abroad, 65, VAND. L. REV. 249, 261 (2012); Geneva
Conventions Common Article 3, AP I, art. 52(1)-(2); AP I, art. 50(1).
177. See Clark, supra note 12, at 10; Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct
Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law 996 (Adopted by the
Assembly of the International Committee of the Red Cross on 26 February 2009),
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/irrc-872-reports-documents.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2Q68-W9FC].
178. The International Committee of the Red Cross is a neutral, independent
organization with a mandate stemming from the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their
Additional Protocols to ensure humanitarian protection and assistance for victims of war
and armed violence and promotes respect for international humanitarian law. Who We
Are, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/en/who-we-are
[https://perma.cc/E64D-L6D6].
179. See Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions), Study on Targeted Killings, 3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010)
https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.
pdf [https://perma.cc/5A88-ZRU4].
180. Such conduct includes political advocacy, supplying food or shelter, or economic
support and propaganda. See id.
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specific war-sustaining act is interpreted as directly participating
in hostilities based on the context of the situation.181
2. The Element of Distinction in Targeted Killings
Distinction is the cornerstone of international humanitarian
law.182 Under the principle of distinction, all involved in the armed
conflict must distinguish between combatants and civilian noncombatants.183 Terrorists are not lawful combatants pursuant to
the Geneva Conventions because they do not belong to a nationstate and do not engage in operations in conformity with the laws
of war.184 Therefore, it may be argued that terrorists are civilian
non-combatants unless they are directly taking part in
hostilities.185 Jus in bello forbids targeted drone strikes against
civilian non-combatants.186
The United States Supreme Court has affirmed that terrorists
engaging in military action may be classified as combatants, albeit
unlawful combatants.187 Pursuant to jus in bello, the US
government asserts that terrorists as combatants, can be targeted
and killed by lawful combatants when not directly taking part in
hostilities.188 The United States is presented with two distinction
issues when making targeting decisions. The first issue is
distinguishing between terrorist fighters and civilian noncombatants for purposes of adding an individual to the kill list.189
The second issue is that, once on the kill list, whether an individual

181. See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 28, at ¶ 5.8.3.
182. Antoine
Bouvier
et
al.,
Principle
of
Distinction,
ICRC,
https://casebook.icrc.org/law/principle-distinction [https://perma.cc/PM7X-C4FB].
183. See id.
184. The definition of combatant derives from the Geneva Convention’s conditions
for being considered a prisoner of war which require that combatants are either members
of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict or members of an organized group placed
under the command of those forces that have a fixed distinctive sign, carry their arms
openly, and conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4(A)(1)-(2), Aug. 12,
1949.
185. See discussion supra Section III.A.1.
186. See Davis et al., supra note 19, at 7.
187. See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30-35 (1942).
188. See Barron Memorandum, supra note 70, at 20; See Foreman, supra note 65, at
930.
189. See Davis et al., supra note 19, at 5.
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can be verified as a legitimate target immediately before he is
killed.190
B.

US Distinction Protocols Fail to Ensure Compliance with Jus in
Bello
1. Addition to the Kill List: A Flawed Approach

President Obama created a Presidential Policy Guidance
(“PPG”) addressing US interpretations of international law and
employment of the targeted killing program.191 The PPG was not
binding law.192 The Obama administration held the view that the
United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda and its
associates that cuts across national borders and that military
action pursuant to this cross-border armed conflict is authorized
by the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force
(“AUMF”).193 The PPG allowed for the President to authorize the
use of force outside of areas of active hostilities.194 The PPG
dictates who can be added to the US kill list and provides a window
into the United States’ interpretation of compliance with the
element of distinction in jus in bello.195 The policy requires that “an
individual whose identity is known” must pose a “continuing,
imminent threat” to US persons to be added to the kill list.196
Adding an operational leader of a terrorist organization to the kill
list is relatively straightforward.197 There is likely direct evidence
of recurring combatant activity and the individual can be properly
190. See id.; See Sehrawat, supra note 172, at 186.
191. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PROCEDURES FOR APPROVING DIRECT ACTION
AGAINST TERRORIST TARGETS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES AND AREAS OF ACTIVE
HOSTILITIES
(2013),
https://www.justice.gov/oip/foialibrary/procedures_for_approving_direct_action_against_terrorist_targets/download
[https://perma.cc/Y5M7-SLCS] [hereinafter Obama PPG Manual].
192. See id.
193. See Brennan, supra note 74; Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United
States, Congress authorized the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons . . . to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States.” Authorization for the Use of Military
Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001).
194. See Obama PPG Manual, supra note 191.
195. See id.
196. See id. at 11.
197. See Gregory McNeal, Kill-Lists and Network Analysis, LAWFARE (Feb. 25, 2013
4:46
PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/kill-lists-and-network-analysis
[https://perma.cc/T77M-CJZV].
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identified as part of a terrorist organization.198 Often, however, the
threat level of a particular terrorist affiliate is blurred, their
identity unconfirmed, and an assessment must be determined
from the intelligence available.199 In enacting the PPG
requirements that a high-value terrorist is present, that the target
has been accurately identified, and that noncombatants will not be
injured,200 it appears the Obama Administration was attempting to
make a distinction between known hostile combatants and foot
soldiers who participate in a singular hostile attack but whose
continuous combatant function is more difficult to verify.201 The
latter may not classify as an unlawful combatant and may only be
targeted when directly engaging in hostilities.202
Both the military and the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”)
conduct targeted killings.203 While there are differences, the
method and approval process for conducting targeted killings and
nomination to the kill lists overlap across these departments.204
The PPG demonstrates an extensive interagency review process
for determining approved targets for killing.205 A nominating
agency first prepares a profile for each nominated target to be
reviewed for legality in taking lethal action.206 Next, the National
Counterterrorism Center (“NCTC”) prepares an assessment of each
nomination.207 The National Security Staff (“NSS”) then convenes a
meeting of the Restricted Counterterrorism Security Group
(“RCSG”)208 to further review the proposed target and compile a
198. See Davis et al., supra note 19, at 5.
199. Davis et al., supra note 19, at 5.
200. See Rita Siemon, Introductory Note to Presidential Policy Guidance: Procedures
for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United States and
Areas of Active Hostilities, 56 INT’L L. MATERIALS 1209, 1210 (2017).
201. See Gregory S. McNeal, Targeted Killing and Accountability, 102 GEO. L.J. 681, 708
(2014); Davis et al., supra note 19, at 5.
202. Davis et al., supra note 19, at 5.
203. See Phillip Alston, The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders, 2 HARV. NAT’L
SEC. J. 283, 284 (2011).
204. See McNeal, supra note 201, at 703-04.
205. See Obama PPG Manual, supra note 191, at 11-18.
206. See id. at 11.
207. See id. at 12.
208. See id. The Restricted Counterterrorism Security Group is chaired by the NSS
Senior Director for Counterterrorism and includes various departments and agencies such
as the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Defense,
the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, CIA Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and the NCTC. See id. at 8 n.6.
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nomination package for review by the National Security Council
Deputies Committee.209 The Deputies Committee then makes a
recommendation for lethal action to the Principal of the
nominating agency.210 After all the Principals of the nominating
agency unanimously agree that lethal action should be taken, and
the President is notified, the nominating agency may authorize
lethal action.211
The process for compiling the kill list during the Obama
administration was complex and time intensive, usually involving
dozens of analysts from different agencies.212 Additionally, it
included intelligence analysis from experts across both military
and civilian agencies and bureaucratic analysis that covered topics
ranging from whether or not an individual was a terrorist to the
long-term impacts of killing that individual.213 The Obama
administration has maintained that this rigorous review process
assures accountability,214 however, this method has not proven to
be fully effective.
To identify potential terrorists for nomination to the kill list,
the United States tracks metadata (electronic patterns of an
individual’s communications, writings, social media postings and
travel) through a program called SKYNET and cellphone tracking

209. The National Security Deputies Committee serves as the senior sub-Cabinet
interagency forum for consideration of and, where appropriate, decision-making on policy
issues that affect the national security interests of the United States. Regular attendees
include the Deputy Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Attorney General, the Deputy Secretary of Energy, the
Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, the Deputy Director of the Office of Management
and Budget, the Deputy Director of National Intelligence, the Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Deputy National
Security Advisor, the Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategy, the Deputy Homeland
Security Advisor, the Deputy Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor to
the Vice President, and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development. See National Security Presidential Memorandum on the Organization of the
National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council and Subcommittees (Apr. 4,
2017),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-04-06/pdf/2017-07064.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G9KZ-WF9S]. See Obama PPG Manual, supra note 191, at 13-14.
210. See Obama PPG Manual, supra note 191, at 13.
211. See id. at 14.
212. See McNeal, supra note 201, at 708.
213. See id. at 708-09.
214. See John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. and
Counterterrorism, Address at the Wilson Center, The Ethics and Efficacy of the President’s
Counterterrorism Strategy (Apr. 30, 2012).
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instead of human-collected intelligence.215 These tactics came to
light after Edward Snowden leaked top-secret documents from the
National Security Agency (“NSA”).216 This leak contained a
PowerPoint presentation from 2012 wherein the United States
erroneously listed a prominent Syrian Al Jazeera journalist named
Ahmad Muffaq Zaidan as a member of al-Qaeda and the Muslim
Brotherhood.217 While the US government had categorized Zaidan
as a terrorist before SKYNET produced his name, he was used as
an example to demonstrate the power of SKYNET to correctly
identify terrorist targets.218 Zaidan has fervently denied any
affiliations with terrorist groups.219 As a journalist, he covered
armed Islamic groups for over a decade and reported their
pronouncements and activities publicly.220 He interviewed Osama
Bin Laden in person many times and his reporting on the 9/11
engineer has been lauded.221 Zaidan’s work as a journalist engaged
in reporting and commentary on the Middle East, terrorism, and
the “War on Terror” requires him to have frequent
communications with sources who have connections with
terrorists and their associates.222 It also results in his social media
accounts containing words and phrases associated with
terrorism.223 Additionally, his work demands that he travel

215. See Clive Stafford Smith, Kill Lists: Barack Obama’s Blind Spot, AL JAZEERA (Nov.
22, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/11/22/kill-lists-barack-obamasblind-spot [https://perma.cc/52MN-3Z96]; Complaint, supra note 12, at 9; D. Parvaz,
Journalists Allege Threat of Drone Execution by US, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 2, 2017),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/4/2/journalists-allege-threat-of-droneexecution-by-us [https://perma.cc/E3EF-HR9J].
216. See Paul Szoldra, This is Everything Edward Snowden Revealed in One Year of
Unprecedented Top-Secret Leaks, BUS. INSIDER (Sep. 16, 2016, 8:00 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/snowden-leaks-timeline-2016-9
[https://perma.cc/8CYL-NSUH].
217. See Cora Currier et al., U.S Government Designated Prominent Al Jazeera
Journalist as “Member of Al Qaida”, THE INTERCEPT (May 8, 2015, 6:27 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2015/05/08/u-s-government-designated-prominent-aljazeera-journalist-al-qaeda-member-put-watch-list/ [https://perma.cc/ZLQ9-WG8N].
218. See id.
219. See Ahmed Zaidan, Al Jazeera’s A. Zaidan: I Am a Journalist Not a Terrorist, AL
JAZEERA (May 15, 2015), https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/5/15/al-jazeeras-azaidan-i-am-a-journalist-not-terrorist/ [https://perma.cc/BGX4-MLGD].
220. See id.
221. See id.; see also Complaint, supra note 12, at 8.
222. Id.
223. See id.
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extensively in countries and regions in which terrorist
organizations are active.224
After the leaked NSA documents seemed to confirm that
government metadata analysis by SKYNET caused Zaidan to be
added to the US kill list, he filed a lawsuit that was subsequently
dismissed.225 The court held that because Zaidan’s name was only
published on SKYNET’s list of potential terrorists, Zaidan would
need to put forth proof that it is plausible that everyone on
SKYNET’s list is also on the kill list, of which he had no evidence
beyond speculation.226 Therefore, the court held that he lacked
injury for Article III standing.227
Thus, despite this extensive inter-agency review process, the
United States incorrectly identified a journalist as a potential
terrorist threat using metadata analysis.228 Whether or not the
SKYNET list coincides with the kill list, a system which
misidentifies civilians through a “guilty by association” mechanism
is inherently flawed.229 This increases the likelihood that innocent
civilians will be an object of attack, therefore violating the
principles of jus in bello.230
2. The United States has a Verification Problem
There are two types of target verification. First, after a
terrorist is added to the kill list, there must be assurance that the
targeted strike is properly carried out. For example, before the
drone operator initiates a strike, she must reasonably ensure231
that the targeted individual in that moment is indeed a legitimate

224. Id.
225. See Zaidan v. Trump, 317 F. Supp. 3d 8, 8 (D.D.C 2018).
226. See id. at 12.
227. See id.
228. Former Director of the NSA and CIA Michael Hayden states that the United
States “kill[s] people based on metadata.” Ryan Goodman, Video Clip of Former Director of
NSA and CIA: “We Kill People Based on Metadata”, JUST SEC. (May 12, 2014),
https://www.justsecurity.org/10318/video-clip-director-nsa-cia-we-kill-people-basedmetadata/ [https://perma.cc/KLG3-5KLR].
229. See Grégoire Chamayou, Theory of the Drone 3: Killing Grounds, GEOGRAPHICAL
IMAGINATIONS (Jul. 29, 2013), https://geographicalimaginations.com/tag/pattern-of-lifeanalysis/ [https://perma.cc/56DM-4PFP].
230. See id.
231. Certainty is not required. See McNeal, supra note 201, at 734-35; See Obama PPG
Manual, supra note 191, at 15.
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target on the kill list.232 The second type of verification is referred
to as a signature strike. A signature strike occurs when the
identities of targets are not known ahead of time, but their
behavior fits a certain pattern that leads the observers to believe
that they are involved in a terrorist organization.233 While
signature strikes present accountability issues of their own, they
are not targeted killings and are therefore beyond the scope of this
Note.234
As to the first type, verification requires finding, fixing, and
tracking the target.235 Such an endeavor entails a considerable
collaborative effort across military and civilian agencies.236 Finding
a target requires intelligence collection activities wherein
individuals are placed into three categories: those distinctly taking
part in hostilities, those who are clearly civilians, and those who
display some characteristics of a legitimate target, but more
analysis must be conducted.237 To fix the target, reconnaissance
and surveillance capabilities are employed to collect pattern of life
information238 that will be used to determine the probable future
location of the target.239 Tracking the target involves collecting
information about the target’s life patterns such as overnight
locations, daily routes, visitations, and trustworthy associates.240
Lastly, both military and CIA drone strikes require reassessment
before engaging in the operation.241 The target must be identified,
and, in the case of a military strike, a commander must be informed
of the assumptions and uncertainties inherent in the information
provided.242
The United States relies on pattern of life data when making
targeting decisions.243 Pattern of life analysis can be helpful in
232. See McNeal, supra note 201, at 734.
233. Scott Englund, What’s Wrong with “Signature Strikes”, 21ST CENTURY GLOB,
DYNAMICS, (Dec. 28, 2016), https://globalejournal.org/global-e/december-2016/whatswrong-signature-strikes [https://perma.cc/Q8CF-LLBD].
234. See id.
235. See McNeal, supra note 201, at 734.
236. See id. at 736.
237. See id. at 735.
238. See infra notes 250-54.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. See id. at 737.
242. See id. at 736.
243. See id. at 717.
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targeting individuals who are not identified operational leaders,
but who are vital to an organization’s terrorist operations through
the strategic role they play in the larger terrorist network.244
However, pattern of life analysis should not be a unilateral
greenlight for target verification given its major flaw of failing to
capture the full story.245 Data is collected through image-streams
that are too imprecise to allow for clear interpretation, and
supplementing them with equally inconclusive evidence like
telephone contacts246 only compounds the data’s unreliability.247
An example of pattern of life analysis gone wrong and
noncompliance with distinction principles occurred in 2010 under
the Obama administration.248 The United States planned to target
and kill Muhammad Amin, a senior commander of the Taliban
operating in Takhar, Afghanistan.249 The US Special Forces unit
tracked Amin’s phone calls and believed that a SIM card
corresponding with one of the numbers Amin had been calling in
Kabul was passed to Amin and that he began to self-identify as
“Zabet Amanullah.”250 This led intelligence officials to conclude
Zabet Amanullah was Amin’s alias.251 However, Amanullah was not
an alias, but the name of a living person.252

244. See Jutta Weber, Keep Adding. On Kill Lists, Drone Warfare and the Politics of
Databases, 34 ENV’T AND PLAN. D: SOC’Y AND SPACE 1, 7 (2015).
245. See Chamayou, supra note 229.
246. The NSA locates drone targets by analyzing the activity of the SIM card, rather
than the actual content of the calls. Jeremy Scahill & Glenn Greenwald, The NSA’s Secret
Role in the U.S. Assassination Program, THE INTERCEPT (Feb. 10, 2014, 12:03 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2014/02/10/the-nsas-secret-role/ [https://perma.cc/T3UJQSSC].
247. See Chamayou, supra note 229.
248. See Clark, supra note 12, at 2.
249. See id. at 2.
250. See id. at 12, 12 n.47, 13 (Kate Clark interviewed with senior officials of the US
Special Forces unit involved in the operation who briefed her on the attack and provided
the opportunity over two extended interviews and follow up questions. The interviews
took place in December 2010 and March 2011).
251. See id. at 12-13.
252. See id.
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Amanullah fought for the Taliban while they ruled in
Afghanistan253 but stopped fighting in 2001.254 Since then, he had
been living quietly and openly as a civilian in Kabul.255 Evidence
shows that he had occasional contact with the Taliban, which is not
automatically suspicious in Afghanistan, a country where power is
frequently shifting and it is a survival tactic to ingratiate oneself
with those who may soon govern the nation.256 In 2010, Amanullah
travelled to Tekhar to campaign for his nephew who was standing
in the parliamentary elections.257 On September 2, 2010, on the
misguided belief that they were targeting and killing Muhammad
Amin, the US Special Forces bombed Amanullah’s election
campaign convoy, killing him.258 An investigation later determined
that the United States had failed to cross-check their intelligence
regarding the telephone contacts, build up a profile on Amin or
Amanullah, gather any human intelligence or make the most basic
inquiries into a target that the United States had been tracking for
months.259 After Amanullah’s death, the United States maintained
that they had indeed killed the senior Taliban commander
Muhammad Amin and that the technical evidence relied on was
irrefutable.260 However, the real Muhammad Amin was located
alive and interviewed in Pakistan, proving this was not the case.261
Severe intelligence failures like this call into question the
legitimacy of John Brennan’s assertions that a “rigorous” review
process was in place to target and kill terrorist threats during the
Obama administration.262

253. The Taliban emerged in the early 1990s as a group of guerilla fighters who
resisted Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from 1979-1989. By September 1996, the
Taliban seized Kabul. From then until the US invasion in 2001 that overthrew the regime,
the Taliban controlled about 90 percent of Afghanistan. See Lindsay Maizland, The Taliban
in Afghanistan, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Mar. 15, 2021, 12:00 PM),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan [https://perma.cc/3Q2H-Z8VJ];
Clark, supra note 12, at 2.
254. See Clark, supra note 12, at 2.
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. See id. at 25-26.
260. See id. at 13; Frontline: Kill/Capture (PBS television broadcast May 10, 2011).
261. See id. at 17.
262. See Brennan, supra note 214.
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3. The Trump Administration’s Erosion of Distinction Protocols
While the Trump administration preserved much of the PPG,
its replacement policy, Principles, Standards and Procedures
(“PSP”) significantly departed from the PPG in two key areas. First,
the policy scraped the “continuing, imminent threat” requisite.263
Second, the PSP relaxed much of the high-level vetting taking place
to authorize a drone strike, presenting serious verification
concerns.264 To the first point, lowering the bar from high-level
militants to foot-soldier jihadis increases the probability that the
principle of distinction outlined in jus in bello will not be satisfied
when carrying out a strike. This is because international
humanitarian law dictates that only combatants may be the object
of an attack.265 A high-profile terrorist leader known to the US
government is an identifiable combatant; but an individual with no
confirmed identity who is not part of a terrorist organization but
has participated in attenuated hostile activity may not rise to the
level of combatant, and therefore his killing can be considered an
attack on a civilian.266
To the second point, identifying a terrorist combatant for
purposes of distinction requires a large collection of intelligence to
be gathered through the combined effort of both civilian and
military agencies.267 President Trump’s relaxing of the interagency review process at the highest levels of government as well
as his removal of the President from the decision-making process
for kill list nomination granted significantly more discretion to
agencies that subsequently increased the number of drone strikes
conducted.268 A failure to vigorously vet targets nominated to the
kill list increases the potential that the United States will target and
kill non-combatant civilians.
263. See Luke Hartig, Trump’s New Drone Strike Policy: What’s Different? Why it
Matters, JUST SEC. (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/45227/trumps-dronestrike-policy-different-matters/ [https://perma.cc/5Q8Y-NY8E].
264. See Charlie Savage & Eric Schmitt, Trump Poised to Drop Some Limits on Drone
TIMES
(Sept.
21,
2017),
Strikes
and
Commando
Raids,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/us/politics/trump-drone-strikes-commandoraids-rules.html [https://perma.cc/6WEV-KBMA].
265. Davis et al., supra note 19, at 7.
266. See discussion supra Section III.A.1.
267. See McNeal, supra note 201, at 736.
268. See Elena Chachko, Administrative National Security, 108 GEO. L.J. 1063, 1085
(2020).
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
The United States’ hesitance to clearly define imminence and
its unsuccessful implementation of accountability practices has
expanded the circumstances under which someone may be the
object of a targeted drone strike and who can be the target of such
a strike, threatening US national security and endangering the lives
of innocent civilians. Unpredictable invocation of Article 51 by the
United States in its military operations raises the risk that other
nations will likewise appeal to Article 51 whenever it is convenient
to advance their military and foreign policy objectives.269 This will
destabilize international expectations of when the use of armed
force is legally acceptable.270 The United States has also failed to
safeguard innocent civilians from being the object of attack
through its insufficient accountability measures.271 Section IV.A
recommends that the United States clearly define its interpretation
of Article 51 by adopting the Chatham principles which both
consider the evolving nature of terrorist threats without
dispensing the spirit of Article 51 as an exception to a prohibition
on the use of force. Section IV.B advocates that in order to ensure
greater accountability by the government, the United States should
pursue legislative action that would increase the avenues by which
victims of unlawful targeted killings may seek redress.
A.

Stabilizing the US Interpretation of the Imminence
Requirement

Imminence is not a standard, rather it is a concept that must
be implemented via a standard.272 As discussed in Section II.A.2,
the term “imminent” is not present in Article 51 of the UN
Charter.273 This suggests that either Article 51 has developed a new
meaning through a process of interpretation, or that a new rule of
customary international law has emerged to supersede Article
51.274 It is clear that over time an imminence requirement has been

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

See discussion supra Section II.C.
See discussion supra Section II.C.
See discussion supra Section III.B.
O’Connell, supra note 8, at 51.
See supra Section II.A.2; U.N. Charter art. 51.
O’Connell, supra note 8, at 7.
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read into Article 51 and has been utilized by States to resort to
force in self-defense before an armed attack occurs.
The current interpretation of the text of Article 51, which
allows for the “inherent right of individual or collective selfdefense if an armed attack occurs” presents many issues.275 This
interpretation’s “imminent threat” standard does not neatly
correspond with the text of Article 51 which refrains from using
wording that authorizes use of force in anticipation of an armed
attack.276 The broadening of the interpretation of imminence
threatens to erode the concept of imminence altogether by
allowing States to circumvent the prohibition on the use of force in
Article 2(4).
There are three different paths that the United States can take
moving forward. First, the United States can continue to expand the
concept of imminence as it sees fit to carry out its national security
objectives. Currently, the United States interprets Article 51 to
allow for anticipatory self-defense in the context of an imminent
threat by non-state actors.277 However, as discussed, recent
targeted killings suggest that strikes are being conducted
preemptively, only on the mere possibility of an attack at some
unspecified, future period of time.278 On the other end of the
spectrum, the second option is to begin the process of reverting to
the textualist interpretation of Article 51, phasing out the
application of imminence as a justification for the use of force, and
only resorting to force after an armed attack has occurred by a
State-actor. Lastly, the United States can strike a balance between
its legitimate counterterrorism objectives and its adherence to
international law by resorting to force only in relation to an
imminent and ongoing armed attack by both State and non-State
actors. Weighing all three of these options, option three presents
the most feasible solution that both complies with international
law and considers the reality that terrorism presents for the United
States.

275.
276.
277.
278.

See U.N. Charter art. 51.
O’Connell, supra note 8, at 7.
DEP’T OF JUST. WHITE PAPER, supra note 61.
See Helene Cooper et al., supra note 97.
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This third option is an articulation of the Chatham
principles.279 The principles provide that (1) the law on selfdefense encompasses more than the right to use force in response
to an ongoing attack and (2) force may be used in self-defense only
in relation to an “armed attack” whether imminent or ongoing.280
In this context, “imminent attack” is described as one in which
there is “no practical alternative to the proposed use of force that
is likely to be effective in ending or averting the attack.”281 The text
of Article 51 requires that an armed attack is underway, and the
Chatham principles comply with this requirement. 282 The Obama
and Trump administrations disposed of the requirement of an
armed attack, pulling the word “imminence” from the Chatham
Principles and converting the standard to one of an imminent
threat.283 The Department of Justice under the Obama
administration went so far as to say that there need not be clear
evidence of a specific attack on a US person or interests in the
immediate future to warrant the use of force in self-defense.284
This can hardly be characterized as a requirement at all, and
disregards the text of Article 51 and the purpose of its
enactment.285 Moreover, this solution proposes an imminence
279. Chatham House is an independent international affairs think tank with a history
dating back to the First World War that provides analysis on key issues that defined the
twentieth century. Some impactful projects undertaken by the institute include helping to
develop financial stability after the Second World War, providing a platform for African
leaders during decolonization, and assisting nations in combatting climate change. See
HOUSE,
https://www.chathamhouse.org/about-us
About
Us,
CHATHAM
[https://perma.cc/CY75-U54Y] (last visited Apr. 9, 2021); Our History, CHATHAM HOUSE,
https://www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/our-history [https://perma.cc/4V9F-C6W4]
(last visited Sept.. 24, 2021).
280. See Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Principles of International Law on the Use of Force by
HOUSE
1,
4-5
(Oct.
1,
2005),
States
in
Self-Defense,
CHATHAM
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2005/10/principles-international-law-use-forcestates-self-defence [https://perma.cc/Z7ZK-X4UA].
281. See id.
282. Many scholars interpret Article 51’s language of “if an armed attack occurs” as
the right to intercept an attack in progress. This is because the “occurs” can mean “has
occurred” just as much as it can mean “is occurring.” O’Connell, supra note 8, at 41.
283. See DEP’T OF JUST. WHITE PAPER, supra note 61; see also Stephen W. Preston, Gen.
Couns. Dep’t Defense, Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: The
Legal Framework for the United States’ Use of Military Force Since 9/11 (Apr. 10, 2015).
284. See DEP’T OF JUST. WHITE PAPER, supra note 61; See Preston, supra note 283.
285. During the development process of Article 2(4), a UN delegate clarified that
Article 2(4) was to be interpreted “in the broadest terms an absolute all-inclusive
prohibition” to ensure there were no loopholes. See Edward Gordon, Article 2(4) in
Historical Context, 10 Yale L.J. 271, 276 (1985).
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interpretation broader than the text of Article 51, in that it does not
require that a State wait to resort to force in self-defense until after
an armed attack has occurred, but not so broad as to allow an
invocation of Article 51 without an imminent or ongoing attack
that leaves a State with no practical alternatives.
The Chatham principles leave room for an imminence
interpretation that acknowledges the danger of terrorism today.
The Chatham House approach permits governments to determine
what counts as “no practical alternative . . . that is likely to be
effective.”286 Therefore, it maintains the spirit of Article 51 that
imminence is a temporal requirement which requires the United
States to produce evidence that there is at least an attack being
planned. However, it leaves up for interpretation the evidence
necessary for determining “practical alternatives.”
B.

Establishing Accountability Through Legislative Action

1. The Judiciary is Not Suited to Set a Scheme for Providing
Redress to Victims
Under the Obama administration the Executive Branch
attempted to increase accountability by publishing the PPG287 and
assuring Americans that rigorous review of admittance to the kill
list and authorization of drone strikes was being conducted at the
highest levels of government.288 Yet, innocent civilians are still
being targeted.289 The most realistic option to enact change in the
sphere of accountability would be for Congress to act.
It is worth discussing why Congress, rather than the judiciary,
is better suited for this role. Most national security issues cannot
be challenged through coercive measures such as injunctive,

286. O’Connell, supra note 8, at 42.
287. See Off. of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for
the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active
WHITEHOUSE
ARCHIVES
(May
23,
2013),
Hostilities,
OBAMA
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/fact-sheet-uspolicy-standards-and-procedures-use-force-counterterrorism [https://perma.cc/K8X246LA].
288. See Brennan, supra note 214; President Barack Obama, Remarks by the
President at the National Defense University (May 23, 2013).
289. See Zaidan, 317 F. Supp. at 14; see also Clark, supra note 12.
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habeas corpus, or Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) claims,290
and thus are brought through a claim for damages.291 In Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the
Court authorized “an implied cause of action to remedy a
constitutional violation” through a suit for money damages against
the responsible federal official(s).292 For some time, Bivens was
seen to serve many vital needs, such as vindicating the
Constitution, providing compensation and redress for wrongs,
maintaining the rule of law, and deterring federal government
violation of the Constitution.293 Some scholars have suggested that
a Bivens claim is a plausible mode of redress for family members of
those killed unlawfully through the US targeted killing program,
and establishes civil liability for officials whose conduct in
approving or carrying out the strike violated the Constitution.294
However, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected a Bivens
approach to national security claims on separation of power
grounds.295 After 9/11 the courts were inundated with suits for
money damages against US officials,296 but the Federal Courts of
Appeals unanimously held that Bivens suits involving sensitive
national security or foreign relations issues were inappropriate.297
This was nearly solidified in Ziglar v. Abbasi and in Hernandez v.
Mesa where the Court held that national security policy is the realm
of Congress and the President, and that judicial intervention to
hold an officer personally liable while acting in a national security
capacity would create over-deterrence in that officer’s abilities to
290. For example, tortious action must be conducted pursuant to official policy, and
represent final agency action to be challenged under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Additionally, if there is no detention, a writ of habeas corpus is inaccessible. Lastly, if the
challenged government wrong is no longer occurring and is unlikely to reoccur (such as a
targeted killing on an individual), injunction cannot be sought. See Andrew Kent,
Redressing National Security Torts in the Post-Bivens Era in JUDGING NATIONAL SECURITY: THE
EVOLVING JUDICIAL ROLE IN NATIONAL SECURITY CASES (forthcoming 2020/2021) (manuscript
at 1) (on file with author).
291. See id.
292. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855 (2017); See Kent, supra note 290
(manuscript at 2).
293. See Kent, supra note 290 (manuscript at 4-5).
294. See Jameel Jaffar, Judicial Review of Targeted Killings, HARV. L. REV. F. (Apr. 9,
2013),
https://harvardlawreview.org/2013/04/judicial-review-of-targeted-killings/
[https://perma.cc/V96N-AG6W].
295. See Kent, supra note 290 (manuscript at 2).
296. See id.
297. See id.
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carry out their functions.298 Accordingly, it seems that the courts
have passed the onus of accountability for targeted killings onto
Congress and the President.
2. Congress Should Amend Standing Legislation
Creating a system of redress for victims of national security
violations will be most effective through legislative action. One
option would be for Congress to expand the Torture Victims
Protection Act (“TVPA”).299 The TVPA gives rights to US citizens
and non-US citizens to bring claims in US courts for torture and
extrajudicial killing committed in foreign countries.300 TVPA suits
can be filed against individuals acting in their official capacity for
any foreign nation.301 Presently, US government actors can never
be sued under this statute.302 However, Congress can amend the
TVPA to allow civil suits to be brought against individuals acting in
their official capacity for the United States.
The TVPA was enacted to implement certain aspects of the
international Convention Against Torture, a non-self-executing
treaty303 to which the United States is a party.304 The Convention
obligates state parties to adopt measures to ensure that those
committing torture and extrajudicial killings are held legally
accountable for their acts.305 The Senate committee report outlined
the need for the TVPA, stating that “[o]fficial torture and summary
execution violate standards accepted by virtually every nation,”
and while “[t]his universal consensus condemning these practices
has assumed the status of customary international law,” many
nations still tolerate and employ such acts.306 In order to fully
capture the purpose and spirit of the Convention Against Torture,
298. Id. (manuscript at 9-10).
299. Id. (manuscript at 13).
300. Torture Victims Protections Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
301. Id.
302. See Kent, supra note 290 (manuscript at 13).
303. A self-executing treaty is one that may be directly applied in the courts, whereas
a non-self-executing treaty is one that requires legislative implementation before it may
be applied by the courts (and other domestic law-applying officials). Carlos Vasquez,
Professor, Georgetown University, The Distinction Between Self-Executing and Non-SelfExecuting Treaties in International Law (May 10, 2018).
304. STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 198 (Wolters Kluwer eds., 6th ed.
2016).
305. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3 (1991).
306. Id.

150

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:1

the United States should have created a cause of action for torture
and extrajudicial killing by individuals acting in capacity of the US
government.307 There is no explanation as to why this was not
done. Doing so would only serve to promote the intent of the TVPA,
which is to hold perpetrators of torture and extrajudicial killings
legally accountable.308
Another option for Congress to provide redress for victims of
targeted killings by the US government would be to add a civil
provision to the War Crimes Act of 1996 (“WCA”).309 The WCA
criminalizes “grave breaches” of international humanitarian law as
laid out in Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.310
“Grave breaches” include torture, rape, and murder, among other
specified violations.311 Congress specifically ratified the WCA in
order to adhere to the Geneva Convention’s requirement that
parties to the Convention impose effective penal sanctions on
persons who commit a “grave breach” of those Conventions.312 The
Act applies regardless of whether the offense occurs inside or
outside the United States.313
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the United
States is in a non-international armed conflict with al-Qaeda and
its associated forces, and that this armed conflict is governed by
international humanitarian law.314 The WCA exists to penalize
violators of international humanitarian law, and therefore, a civil
remedy under the WCA could help victims of targeted killings by
US personnel pursuant to this armed conflict.315 The United States
has never prosecuted anyone under the WCA, however, and
therefore its scope remains untested.316

307. See Kent, supra note 290 (manuscript at 13).
308. See S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3 (1991); See Kent, supra note 290 (manuscript at
13).

309. See Kent, supra note 290 (manuscript at 14).
310. 18 U.S.C. § 2441.
311. See MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL 733662 THE WAR CRIMES ACT:
CURRENT ISSUES 6 (2009).
312. See id. at 1.
313. See id.
314. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 628-631 (2006).
315. See Kent, supra note 290 (manuscript at 14).
316. Oona Hathaway et al., The US, the War on Yemen, and the War Crimes Act – Part
I, JUST SEC. (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/54444/us-war-yemen-warcrimes-act/ [https://perma.cc/97L2-NSM3].
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3. A Rulemaking Solution to Increasing Accountability
Another way to help solve the problem of accountability as it
relates to the United States’ interpretation of international law for
purposes of implementing targeted killings, is for the Department
of State (“DOS”) to promulgate a rule clearly defining the
requirements and restrictions international humanitarian law
places on the exercise of targeted killings. Then, the DOS could
make violators of that rule civilly liable. The DOS is the United
States’ leading authority on foreign policy and therefore has the
expertise, the resources, and the influence to implement a rule
solidifying the bounds in which the United States can act. This
solution would require Congress to pass a statute delegating
rulemaking authority to the DOS on the issue.
The Supreme Court has held that Congress can delegate
authority to administrative agencies to pass regulations that have
the force of law as long as the legislature lays out an intelligible
principle to which administrators can conform.317 Congress may
pass a statute that specifically directs an agency to accomplish a
particular problem or solve a certain goal.318 Rules relating to
military and foreign affairs, such as this proposed solution, are
exempt from formal notice and comment rulemaking
procedures319 under the Administrative Procedure Act320 and can
be directly implemented through publication to the Federal
Register.321
One issue with this proposed solution is that since the rule
would not have to go through formal rulemaking or notice and
317. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 474-476 (2001); LINDA D.
JELLUM, MASTERING LEGISLATION, REGULATION, AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 355-56
(Carolina Academic Press eds., 3rd ed. 2020).
318. OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, A GUIDE TO THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 2 (2011),
https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6D8K-9ADS].
319. There are three different processes by which agencies can promulgate rules.
The first is formal rulemaking, which requires a hearing with trial-like procedures. The
second is notice and comment rulemaking, which requires an agency to publish notice of
its proposed rule in the Federal Register and to solicit and respond to comments from the
public and others about the proposed rule. The last process is publication rulemaking,
which allows direct publication of a rule to the Federal Register. See JELLUM, supra note
317, at 356-58.
320. The Administrative Procedure Act governs the process in which administrative
agencies construct and promulgate regulations. 5 U.S.C. § 551.
321. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a).
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comment, there is less process involved with publishing it, and
therefore less process involved in amending or repealing it.322
Accordingly, its enactment and enforcement may rest on the
political inclinations of changing administrations. Although the
rule may not have to undergo notice and comment to be repealed,
it may, however, find a haven in the APA’s prohibition against
agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law.”323 The “arbitrary and
capricious” standard requires that an agency “must examine the
relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action
including a rational connection between the facts found and the
choice made.”324 The APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard
applies both when an agency issues a rule and when it rescinds an
earlier rule.325 The Supreme Court has held that agencies must
supply a “reasoned analysis” when it changes course by rescinding
a rule.326 The agency must explain the change from its prior
regulatory approach, address prior factual findings that contradict
those underlying the new policy, and consider “serious reliance
interests” that are affected by a change in policy.327 Therefore,
repealing a finalized rule by the DOS would still require a level of
review, safeguarding it from instantaneous repeal.
V. CONCLUSION
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States has
proliferated its use of targeted drone strikes to combat terrorism,
expanding the circumstances under which a targeted drone strike
may be conducted as well as the pool of individuals it deems
eligible to be the object of a targeted drone attack. This
proliferation is due to US maneuvering of the imminence
requirement under Article 51 and a lack of effective accountability
measures for targeted drone strikes. Both mechanisms present
distinct legal issues with national security ramifications.
322. See 16 C.F.R. § 1.15 (2012).
323. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
324. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
325. See DANIEL J. SHEFFNER & KATE R. BOWERS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB 10566 RESPONSES
TO MIDNIGHT RULEMAKING: LEGAL ISSUES 4 (2021).
326. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 42 (1983).
327. See SHEFFNER & BOWERS, supra note 325, at 2120.
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First, each US administration since 2001 has modified the
concept of imminence to fit its military and foreign policy
objectives. Inconsistency in application of the imminence
requirement by the United States has cleared the way for other
nations to similarly manipulate the requirement to fit their goals,
creating an international atmosphere of unpredictability in the use
of force in self-defense. To help solve this problem, the United
States should stabilize its imminence interpretation by considering
both its counterterrorism goals and adherence to international
law, and resort to force only in relation to an imminent and ongoing
armed attack by a State or non-State actor.
Second, US government officials are not being held
accountable for violations of international humanitarian law. The
lack of accountability for US officials is both a cause and a product
of innocent civilians being nominated to the kill list and in some
instances, actually killed when the United States fails to verify its
targets. In order to increase accountability amongst those
nominating and authorizing targeted killings, the United States
should call on Congress to amend and implement legislation for
victims to seek redress. With advances in technology that increase
the risk of terrorism, and the advantages of the targeting killing
program in addressing this increased risk,328 the employment of
targeted killings to fight terrorism is likely here to stay.329 As a
328. The use of drones in executing targeting killings saves American lives. Because
drones contain no human operators onboard, operators can engage in warfare from the
safety of a military confine, alleviating the need to deploy soldiers into dangerous and
politically sensitive areas. See Nathan R. Fields, Advantages and Challenges of Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle Autonomy in the Postheroic Age at 25 (May 2012) (M.A thesis, James
Madison University) (on file with James Madison University).
329. While this Note does not analyze the Biden administration’s targeted drone
strike policies, it is relevant to consider that the Biden administration had hoped to release
an official updated drone policy for strikes in countries where the US is not at war by the
twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. Its expected approach was to reimplement the
Obama era policy of high-level interagency vetting while maintaining part of the Trump
administration blueprint that allows commanders greater latitude in the field to carry out
strikes in countries like Somalia and Afghanistan. Just after President Biden took office, the
administration released a policy directive that all drone strikes away from battlefield
zones needed White House approval before an official policy went into place in September
2021. However, military commanders have already proven that they can sidestep existing
rules regarding the execution of drone strikes outside of conventional battle zones. The
military’s Africa Command carried out three drone strikes against the al-Qaida militant
group Al-Shabab in Somalia in late July and early August without White House approval,
invoking the rule’s “self-defense” exception. And while the Biden administration claims to
be taking an approach that would provide greater safety to civilians than Trump’s PSP, ten

154

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:1

global leader, the United States must reevaluate its approach to
targeted killings and act to ensure its compliance with
international law in its operations going forward.

civilians, eight of them children, were killed in a strike in Afghanistan on August 29, 2021,
that was conducted to thwart a purported planned attack by the Islamic State. Given the
recent turbulence in Afghanistan, the administration has not met its September 2021
deadline, and their initial plans to better adhere to international humanitarian law and
increase mechanisms of accountability are in flux. See Charlie Savage, Afghanistan Collapse
and Strikes in Somalia Raise Snags for Drone Warfare Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/28/us/politics/biden-drones.html
[https://perma.cc/5MU7-HHSQ]; Susannah George, 10 Civilians Killed in US Drone Strike in
POST
(Aug.
30,
2021),
Kabul,
Family
Says,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/08/30/drone-civilians-islamic-state/
[https://perma.cc/LQ4B-LJDE].

